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MALE REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY:
UNPLANNED FATHERHOOD AND THE VICTORY
OF CHILD SUPPORT
By: Preston D. Mitchum

I.

Introduction

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2 In
other words, United States citizens are entitled to
due process and equal treatment under the law, and
may only be denied if the government has a narrowly
tailored and compelling state interest.3 This article
will explore two issues: (1) what happens when one
gender has received more constitutional protections
for reproductive rights and autonomy; and (2)
whether the government is actively discriminating
by denying men the right to bodily integrity and
reproductive autonomy?
The right to bodily integrity is often
recognized as one of the oldest fundamental rights
in American jurisprudence. Although not explicitly
articulated in the text of the United States
Constitution, the right to bodily integrity is arguably
protected in the Fourth Amendment, Eighth
Amendment, and even in common law doctrines.'
The notion of bodily integrity, however, is most
often inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' In Washington v. Glucksberg,
the Supreme Court of the United States held, "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause
[of the Fourteenth Amendment] includes the right . .
to bodily integrity... The liberty interest espoused
in Glucksberg protects men and women from
unwarranted governmental intrusions, and entitles
both genders to bodily integrity.' However, while
reproductive and parental rights have expanded for
women, they have been drastically reduced for men.'
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Male reproductive autonomy is nonexistent."o Recently, fathers, have not been successful
when petitioning the court for custody and
visitation rights." Fathers' rights have continually
been weakened in the court system with respect
to reproductive rights, custody proceedings, and
adoptions.1 2 Despite the predominance of men on
the Supreme Court, fathers' rights have often been
viewed as irrelevant and insignificant.1 3 To protect
the constitutionally recognized liberty interests of all
citizens, the lack of fathers' rights must change. In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court of the United
States held, "[e]quality of treatment and the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked
in important respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests."" Therefore, men
and women both deserve constitutional protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
reproductive autonomy." Ultimately, at the center
of autonomy cases is largely the bodily integrity
right, coupled with the right to make intimate and
important decisions."
Reproductive rights jurisprudence and the
right to protect one's health are at the forefront of
safeguarding an individual's right to autonomy. 17
Fathers perceive that they either have no rights or
minimal rights with regards to reproductive decisionmaking and the parenting of their children.
Unfortunately, the only constitutional norm involving
fathers' rights is that those "rights" are a misnomer."
It is critical to recognize gender challenges and
stereotypes without demeaning motherhood and the
role women play in reproductive rights.2 0 However,
the fact remains, the negative bias against fathers
makes the perception of "no rights" difficult to
argue.2 1 Moreover, this bias creates an impossible
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hurdle for men in exercising both reproductive and
parental rights."
If the court system determines that men have
less reproductive rights than women, it would open
Pandora's Box to many constitutional infringements.
Affording fathers fewer rights than mothers regarding
reproduction, autonomy, and parenthood may
unleash an evil, impossible to be undone.
Part I of this article will examine the negative
societal bias placed on men, and whether it affects
the Court's approach when rendering decisions on
reproductive rights, family, and parental decisions.
Part II will examine the constitutional framework
on prior cases, such as Stanley v. Illinois,23 Quilloin
Walcott,24 and Lehr v. Robertson,25 regarding father's
rights, gender discrimination, and illegitimacy. Part
III will discuss Phillips v. Irons,26 a 2005 case that
significantly diluted male reproductive rights, and
also suggested possible remedies in unorthodox
situations. Lastly, Part IV will examine the role
of child support, the criticism of child support in
instances of unplanned pregnancies, and the "male
abortion" option. Ultimately, the question remains
whether male reproductive autonomy is entitled to
the same standard of constitutional protection as
female reproductive autonomy or whether women
are entitled to more rights because reproductive
autonomy is generally viewed as a woman's right.
li. Negative Societal Bias, Fatherhood, and
Reproductive Rights
The Constitution protects, in some measure,
each person's autonomy in making decisions
about family, parenthood, and procreation.2 7 The
question remains, however, whether this reproductive
decision-making is equal for men and women. Many
fathers are skeptical that their rights will be adequately
heard in court because their interests have frequently
been unrecognized and unsupported.28 Oftentimes,
this cynicism derives from the negative societal bias
that many fathers encounter.29
While marriage confers greater legal
consideration for fathers, the state recognizes their
vows, and not their parenting. 0 However, this
negative view is not an entirely accurate depiction
of the Court's recent decisions.3 1 For example, in
2003, the Supreme Court recognized broad concepts
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of shared parenting and gender-neutral support
of both mothers and fathers. 32 Nonetheless, this
negative view suggests that stereotypes relating to
fathers are present despite changing constitutional
norms. 33 Unfortunately, the Court has used negative
stereotypes about fathers when rendering decisions
on male reproductive rights and fatherhood. 34 As a
result, the discussion of reproductive rights is typically
incomplete because a vital element often lacking - the
voice of the male." Consequently the reproductive
rights movement should be carefully examined and
scrutinized.3 6 The assumption of women as nurturing
juxtaposed with the assumption of men as unable
to be caregivers, continues to cause fathers' trouble
when seeking equality for reproductive autonomy
and procreative rights. 37
According to the views of many fathers,
the family law system is deeply biased against them,
providing unequal treatment regarding procreation,
family, and parenthood.38 Furthermore, partiality
against fathers represents a highly visible sign of
negative societal bias about men's caregiving abilities
that contradict the legal preference ofgender equality.3 9
Although the supposed legal standard is "shared
parenting," it remains the common assumption that
"women are advantaged in custody proceedings even
when men are equal or more involved caregivers."40
Moreover, another example of men's care and
fathers' rights being consistently ignored is in data
collection regarding childcare. 1 According to Fast
Facts on Welfare Policy, data collection about childcare
continues to focus on the role of the mother.4 2
Specifically, "[d]ata on child care arrangements were
obtained by conducting interviews with the adult
most knowledgeable about the child. Since this person
was most often the mother (71.5 percent), the term
'mother' [was] used ... to refer to this respondent."43
Thus, according to the same statistics, only 29.5%
of fathers are most knowledgeable about their child."
Although a specific research methodology was
never mentioned on how data was collected, these
statistics only heighten the negative stereotype and
societal bias against male reproductive rights and
fatherhood. Consequently, the Court will continue
to use this rationale when rendering decisions about
reproduction and procreation.
The perception that fathers have minimal
reproductive rights seems ironic considering the
dominance of male judges on the bench. 6 However,
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fathers continue to believe they have no rights in
reproductive decision-making or parenting their
children.17 In fact, many fathers believe their only
"right," as consistently adopted by the Court, is
the right to pay "obligations, particularly financial
obligations [that] are unfairly placed upon them.""*
The next question to address is the definition
of fatherhood, and what role, if any, fatherhood plays
in determining reproductive rights. Some fathers
argue for a genetically-based definition of fatherhood
to correct the negative societal bias." This definition
recognizes that the fundamental rights of biological
fathers must be respected." An example of this
genetically-based definition is articulated in Elk Grove
Unified School Districtv. Newdow.5
In Newdow, the plaintiff, Michael Newdow,
advocated for a presumption in favor of joint physical
custody for non-marital or divorced fathers based
on genetic parenthood, and claimed that it was a
constitutional entitlement.5 2 Newdow, a divorced
father, sued his daughter's school district on behalf
of himself and his daughter as his "next friend."" He
claimed that the words "under God" in the pledge
of allegiance constituted an infringement of First
Amendment rights. I would add a footnote and
cite this assertion as Id. at 1. Even though Newdow
was his daughter's biological parent, the Court
determined that Newdow lacked standing, literally
had no right to be heard. " This decision is important
because it stands for the proposition that a status of
a noncustodial father will trump the legal standard
of "shared parenting."" In addition, although it was
not specifically articulated, the societal bias of a father
being an atheist could have been perceived negatively,
and thus could have also affected the Court's decision.
Other fathers argue that caretaking should be
supported by using a functional or relational definition
that centers on nurture." Following a modern
definition of nurture would help to discard outdated
stereotypes about men as incompetent caregivers, as
well as patriarchal norms of status based on genetic
and economic fatherhood.5 7 Constitutional norms of
fatherhood need a paradigm shift from genetic-based
definitions to nurture-based." Until this change is
recognized, society's negative bias on fatherhood and
male reproductive autonomy will continue to affect
the Court's decision-making process.
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Iii. Fatherhood Cases: The Good, The Bad, And
The Ugly
Throughout legal history, great emphasis has
been placed on women's procreative and reproductive
rights." The constitutional framework of privacy
in regard to reproductive rights has generally, if not
always, expanded the rights of women. 60 However,
men have been silenced throughout the procreation
debate although they have been recognized as having
similar privacy interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process clause."
Although this right under substantive due process
was explicitly acknowledged in Lawrence, a similar
right should be extended in the context of male
reproductive autonomy.62 While the holding in
Lawrence may seem remote from the definition of
fatherhood and reproductive autonomy, the rationale
derived from Lawrence is extremely important.6 3
Lawrence is grounded in constitutionally
recognized liberty interests, which encompass both
autonomy and relational ties. According to Justice
Kennedy, "Liberty presume[d] an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct."" It is, therefore,
important that men are recognized as having similar
reproductive rights when compared to women. If
not, the general principle of liberty, as indicated in
Lawrence, will be disregarded. Thus, fatherhood and
male reproductive autonomy must be recognized as
a fundamental constitutional consideration that is
equivalent to its female counterpart.
Moreover, one of the constitutional
protections afforded to each individual is the concept
of liberty. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvaniav. Casey, the Court articulated, "[o] ur law
affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education. "66
One of the constitutional protections afforded
to each individual is the concept of liberty. The
definition of liberty in Lawrence by Justice Kennedy
embraces constitutional protections of privacy in
relationships.6 7 As such, one of those relationships
is between a father and his child.68 Coincidentally,
another similar relationship is between a man and his
right to not have a child.
In the following line of cases, the Court has
decided on existing constitutional doctrines about
THE MODERN AM ERICAN

fatherhood.6 ' First, in some core fatherhood decisions
in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court determined
when the constitutional rights are triggered for
unmarried fathers. 70 Second, the set of fatherhood
cases reflect a deeply-rooted prejudice against
unmarried fathers and perpetuates the assumption
that fathers, and ultimately men, are "breadwinners"
and not caregivers. 7 ' Two principles emerge from
the fatherhood cases: "(1) biology plus something
more, in the nature of intention or demonstration
of nurture, even if minimalistic, is necessary to be
recognized as a legal father; and (2) marriage, or
maybe legitimacy plus marriage, trumps biological
and social fatherhood." 72 The following three cases
illustrate inconsistencies in the application of the
nurture standard and the unjustified stereotypes
about fathers and their ability to exercise reproductive
rights.73
A.

Stanley v. Illinois ("The Good')
State laws have discriminated against unwed

fathers dating before the 1970s. 7 ' After Stanley V.
Illinois, fathers saw a glimmer of hope for regaining
equality in parenting and autonomy.75 Unfortunately,
this glimmer faded away after the Court decided
Quilloin v. Walcott and Lehr v. Robertson.7' Although
Stanley does not provide a solution for unmarried
biological fathers, it does serve as a useful tool for
reproductive rights, autonomy, and fatherhood.77
Stanley was the first case where the Supreme Court of
the United States considered the custodial rights for
an unmarried biological father.
When Illinois mother Joan Stanley died,
Peter Stanley ("Stanley") lost both his partner and
his children.79 According to Illinois law, "the children
of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon
the death of the mother."so Upon Joan Stanley's
death, the State of Illinois initiated a dependency
proceeding." Although no determination was made
as to Stanley's fitness, the children were declared
wards of the state, and placed with court-appointed
guardians.82 This proceeding would not have taken
place if Stanley were (1) a married biological father;
(2) a married biological mother; or (3) an unmarried
biological mother. 3 Thus, the Illinois law presumed
that married parents and unmarried mothers were
fit parents, while unmarried biological fathers were
presumed to be unfit parents." Stanley contested this
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presumption, claiming that he was a fit parent, and
that he could not be deprived of the care, custody,
and control of his children without Illinois actually
determining that he was unfit." Furthermore, Stanley
claimed Illinois law violated Equal Protection by
discriminating against him on the basis of him being
an unwed father 86 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected this claim, however, after determining
that "Stanley could properly be separated from his
children upon proof of the single fact that he and the
dead mother had not been married." 7 In Stanley, the
State of Illinois insisted that "most unmarried fathers
are unsuitable and neglectful parents."" The State
further argued that unwed fathers are not presumed
to raise their children, and therefore, individualized
hearings are unnecessary to determine fitness."
Illinois explicitly argued that Stanley's "fitness or
unfitness was irrelevant, because an unwed father was
not a 'parent' whose existing relationship with his
children must be considered . . ."'o
This negative stereotype about fathers
is apparent in many custody proceedings, and in
defining the role of a father." At the Supreme Court,
both the majority and dissent expressed negative
opinions about unwed fathers, and characterized
them as uninterested in their children, and less
connected to their offspring.92 Ultimately, the Court
held that because not all unmarried fathers are unfit
to raise their children, Illinois' presumption against
fitness of an unwed father was unlawful." The State
did not provide evidence to indicate that Stanley
neglected his children. The Court concluded that
all parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing
on their fitness before their children are removed
from their care and custody." Any ruling to the
contrary would contravene the State's articulated goal
of family planning, reproduction and autonomy."
Stanley provides a positive outlook for fathers' rights
and reproductive autonomy because the modern
definition of nurture was impliedly adopted by
the Court.17 For reproductive rights for men to be
protected, the Court should apply definitions of
fatherhood that centers on nurture.
B.

Quilloin v. Walcott ("The Bad")

After 1972, the Court distinguished between
unwed biological fathers who were involved in raising
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their children and fathers who did not assume their
functional responsibilities for them."
Quilloin addressed the constitutionality
of Georgia adoption laws that denied any unwed
father the ability to prevent the adoption of his
illegitimate child." In Quilloin, the child was born in
December 1964 to unmarried parents, and remained
in the custody and control of his mother, Ardell
Williams Walcott, for his entire life." 0 Ardell Walcott
subsequently married another man, and in March
1976, she consented to the adoption of the child
by her husband, and her husband immediately filed
a petition for adoption.' 1 Although Mr. Quilloin
was never found to be an unfit parent, as required
in Stanley, the court granted the adoption despite his
objection. 102
In 1978, Georgia adoption laws prohibited
adoption of a child born in wedlock without the
consent of a living parent who had not surrendered
rights or been adjudicated as an unfit parent."1 3 In
contrast, §§ 74-403 (3) and 74-203 of the Georgia
Code required only the mother's consent for the
adoption of an illegitimate child.104 A father could
have acquired authority to veto such adoption only if
he had legitimated the child pursuant to § 74-103 of
the Georgia Code.' Unless the father legitimates the
child, the mother is the only recognized parent and
therefore has exclusive authority to exercise all parental
prerogatives, including the power to veto adoption
of the child.o 6 Since Quilloin did not petition for
legitimation of his child at any time during the eleven
years between the child's birth and the adoption
petition, the Court held that denying him the right
to object to the child's adoption did not constitute a
deprivation of his due process rights.107
The Court's decision in Quilloin contradicts
its decision in Stanley six years prior, and serves to
weaken father's rights and decision-making abilities.
The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause
would not be offended "[i]f a State were to . . .
breakup a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest."' This
rationale is inconsistent with the holding in Stanley
where the Court established that a biological parent
could not have their rights deprived unless he or she
was determined to be unfit."
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Furthermore, the majority in Quilloin relied
on the state's public policy, which generally held,
"1rearing children in a family setting . . . might be
thwarted if unwed fathers were required to consent to
adoptions. "1 The Court has yet again inconsistently
applied a standard that only serves as a detriment to
unwed biological fathers. In Stanley, the Court held
"[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and
easier than individualized determination . . . [b] ut
. . . it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child."1 "
However, assuming the state's policy would be
thwarted if unwed fathers were required to consent is
the same "procedure by presumption" that the Court
mentioned six years prior.'12 Because the Court's
rationale in Quilloin had a detrimental effect on male
reproductive rights, family, and parenthood, and
conflicts with its precedential decision in Stanley, the
case was wrongly decided.
C Lehr v. Robertson ("The Ugly")
In Lehr, the Court used negative stereotypes
about fathers to deprive Lehr of the opportunity to
establish the same parental right that was automatically
afforded to mothers.' 13 Lehr thus established an
impossible hurdle for male reproductive rights,
family, and parenthood.
On November 9, 1976, Jessica was born
out of wedlock to Lorraine Robertson and Jonathan
Lehr."' Eight months later, Ms. Robertson married
Richard Robertson."' When Jessica was two years
old, the Robertsons filed a petition for adoption, and
on March 7, 1979, and the court entered an order
of adoption.116 Lehr claimed that the Due Process
Clause guaranteed him an absolute right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before his child was
adopted.'1 The Court disagreed, however, because
Lehr never entered his name in the putative father
registry, as required by the State of New York."
According to New York law, "A man who
files with that registry demonstrates his intent to
claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock and is
therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding
to adopt that child.""' New York law further required
notice of an adoption proceeding to several classes of
possible fathers, but Lehr never qualified as a member
of any of those classes. 120 The Court determined that
because Lehr never established a custodial, personal,
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or financial relationship with Jessica, that he was not
entitled to notice that his child was being adopted
by someone else, even though he was her biological

father.
InLehr,the Court furtherskews the established
approach from Stanley to determining father's rights.
Due process does not entitle actual notice to every
putative father or adoptive parents. 122 However, the
State must make a reasonable opportunity to identify
the putative father and give him adequate notice.' 23
Unfortunately, the Court provided no inquiry of
whether the mother knew the biological father
and his location.124 Most importantly, the majority
and minority disagreed over whether Lehr ignored
the child until recently, or, as Lehr claimed, had
consistently attempted to establish contact with her
but was unable because of the mother.125 This was an
incorrect decision by the Court. Instead of placing
more weight on the nurture-based relationship of a
father and his child, the Court completely rejected
the notion that a biological connection provided
the father with any constitutionally recognized
interests.126 Similar to many decisions about fathers'
rights, this decision deprives an unwed biological
father of protected interests that are afforded to the
mother.127

Iv. Unplanned Fatherhood: Is Public Policy the
Correct Application With Fraud and Deceit?
A dilemma many courts encounter is
determining the best approach for unplanned
fatherhood due to fraud and deceit by the mother.128
According to Lisa Belkin, contributing writer on
family and parenting for the New York Times:
It seems dicey for women to argue
that our distinct biology gives us
special rights, considering our long
history of being discriminated
against based on that same biology. And I wonder about the practical costs of excluding men. The
assertion that women have unquestioned dominion over reproductive
decisions seems to help cement the
notion that fathers are minor players
in the life of a family.129
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An interesting conflict with respect to a man's
right to father or not father, a child is created when
the mother has impregnated herself despite assurances
that she was unable to become pregnant.'30 In 2005,
the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the question
of whether the interests of the child always outweigh
those of the father.'' The "best interest of the child"
standard always compels the court to answer in the
affirmative.' 32
In cases of fraudulent conception, what rights
are available for the unplanned father?' 33 Recent cases
express that public policy creates significant hurdles
to economic recovery for men irrespective of whether
the woman acts with malice."' Public policy concerns
constantly overshadow a man's desire of recovery for
deception by a woman."' The public policy issues
that have affected male reproductive rights are child
support and the "best interest of the child," both of
which are meant to serve the economic interest of the
child, and not the parent.1 6
A.

Phillips v. Irons

In Phillips, the Illinois Appellate Court
created a major obstacle for men's procreative
rights.' 7 Phillips weakened any potential to recover
remedies in combating wrongs faced regarding
unplanned fatherhood and the unwanted conception
of a child.' 8
In January 1999, Richard Phillips ("Phillips")
and Sharon Irons ("Irons") began dating.'3 9 Prior to
dating, Irons told Phillips that she was divorced, and
that her previous marriage was a "terrible mistake." 4 0
Shortly thereafter, Phillips and Irons became engaged
to be married.'' During their relationship, Phillips
informed Irons that he wanted to have children, but
only after they were married.'42 As such, Phillips
and Irons discussed using condoms during sexual
intercourse.143 During the course of their relationship,
the parties never engaged in vaginal intercourse,
despite Irons revealing that she could not become
pregnant.'" However, Irons engaged in fellatio
with Phillips three times.'45 Despite the consent
between the parties, Irons "intentionally engaged in
oral sex with [Phillips] so that she could harvest his
semen and artificially inseminate herself."' 46 As if
impregnating herself were not outrageous enough,
Phillips subsequently learned that Irons was still
married to her former husband.'4 1 On May 23, 2003,
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Phillips sought damages for (1) intentional inflection
of emotional distress ("IIED"); (2) fraudulent
misrepresentation; and (3) conversion. 148
The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the
misrepresentation and conversion claims, holding
that the only plausible cause of action for which
Phillips was a claim of IIED."' The court determined
that causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation
and conversion would not successful because (1) no
business transaction was involved"'o and (2) Phillips
had no expectation of his sperm being returned back
to his possession.'
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
To state a cause of action for IIED, Phillips
must prove: (1) Irons's conduct was outrageous; (2)
Irons intended to cause severe emotional distress; and
(3) Irons's conduct actually caused severe emotional

distress.15 2
First, Phillips asserted that Irons's conduct
was outrageous because she lied about her infertility.'53
In addition, he asserted that although Irons consented
to not becoming pregnant prior to their marriage, she
surreptitiously and intentionally impregnated herself
after oral sex."' The court determined that because
no reasonable person would expect a pregnancy from
the unorthodox use of Phillips's sperm, the conduct
was extreme and outrageous.

15

Second, Phillips proved that Irons intended
to cause severe emotional distress.' 6 Phillips argued
that Irons used her scientific knowledge as a medical
doctor to procure his sperm to successfully impregnate
herself.' 7 Furthermore, although Irons was aware
of Phillips's wish to have children only after their
marriage, Irons intentionally acted to contravene this
desire."' The court determined, therefore, that Irons
intended to cause Phillips severe emotional distress.'
Third, Phillips asserted that the conduct
caused severe emotional distress.' 60 The unintended
pregnancy made Phillips so upset that he was
nauseated and unable to eat.' 6 ' Phillips testified that
he felt "trapped in a terrible nightmare," and his
ability to trust anyone has been obliterated.' 62 The
court agreed that Phillips's sentiments were not merely
subjective, but objectively reasonable in light of how
Irons' conduct has affected his life.163 Because Phillips
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successfully satisfied every element to state a cause of
action for IIED, the court ruled in his favor.'64
2.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Phillips argued that Irons fraudulently
misrepresented herself regarding her inability to
become pregnant.' 5 The elements for fraudulent
misrepresentation in Phillips are (1) a false statement
of material fact by Irons, (2) known to be false by
her, (3) intended to induce Phillips to act, (4) Phillips
acted in reliance on the truth of the statement by
Irons, and (5) damages resulted from such reliance.'6 6
The court rejected this cause of action
after determining that "the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation historically has been limited to
cases involving business or financial transactions
where plaintiff has suffered a pecuniary harm. "167
Since Phillips did not allege a financial loss or an
economic injury, he could not successfully claim Irons
conduct constituted fraudulently misrepresentation.
3.

Conversion

Lastly, Phillips argued that Irons took sperm
without his permission and converted it into her own
use by impregnating herself.'68 To succeed in a cause of
action for conversion, Phillips had to prove (1) he had
a right to property, (2) he had a right to immediate
and absolute possession of the property, (3) Irons
assumed unauthorized control of the property, and
(4) Phillips demanded possession.'16 Interestingly,
Irons countered that Phillips delivered his sperm
as a gift, and if he wanted to retain possession, he
should have taken proper precautions, such as use a
condom. 170
In other jurisdictions, courts have recognized
a property right in materials from the human body.'7 '
However, Phillips could not show that he had a right
to immediate possession of his sperm.172 Because
Phillips did not expect the sperm to be returned to
him, the court held that he was unable to satisfy the
elements of a claim for conversion. 7 3
B. PotentialSolution: Sperm Donations
If a father attempts to eliminate or reduce
child support payments due to unplanned fatherhood
because of malicious acts of the woman, he is "seeking
a remedy against the wrong person." 74 As such, the
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only possible solution that would not "penalize"
the father and the child is if the court treats these
situations as sperm donations.
Had Phillips been a sperm donor in the
"traditional" sense rather than gratuitously giving
his sperm, he would have no liability for the child
born as a result of his sperm.' 7 1 Most state statutes
protect sperm donors from potential liability, so they
will continue donating sperm.'7 ' These statutes have
been interpreted to apply to known and unknown
consenting donors.177 Public policy is critical for
sperm donations, and therefore, the State will protect
donors from liabilities and obligations for children
born from their donation. 7 1
To protect Phillips from liability for a child
resulting from Irons's malicious acts, the Appellate
Court of Illinois could have determined that Phillips
17
was an unknown consenting sperm donor."
Phillips and Irons had a clear understanding that no
children were to be born prior to their marriage.'"
However, Irons had other plans and impregnated
herself with his sperm after engaging in oral sex."'
Although eliminating or reducing child support
would negatively affect the child, remedies must
exist to protect men from liability in cases of malice
and intentional wrongdoing. Many proponents of
male reproductive rights have suggested that the
male abortion I don't know if these quotes should
be deleted, but the blog doesn't use this term - only
the people who have commented on the blog used
the term "male abortion" option is the only practical
remedy. 182

V. Child Support and the "Male Abortion"
This section raises and responds to three
important questions in the debate of unplanned
fatherhood, and attempts to provide possible remedies
for unintended pregnancies without diminishing
women's reproductive rights. First, if a man makes
it clear, before a child is conceived, that he does not
want to be a father, and a woman agrees that she
will terminate an unintended pregnancy, should he
have to pay child support if she changes her mind? 83
Second, if a couple find themselves unexpectedly
expecting a child, and the mother wants to terminate
but the father says he will take full responsibility for
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the baby after it is born, should he have a legal right
to require her to carry the child to term?' Lastly,
does a man have the right to: (1) contest paternity;
(2) counterclaim against a woman's paternity claim;
or (3) recover from a mother for a child for which he
had never planned or desired?'15
To address these issues, advocates suggested
the "male abortion" as a possible remedy for men.
Male reproductive rights advocates coined the
term "male abortion" in the late 1990s as a way of
bringing attention to the lack of male autonomy in
procreation."' In Dubay v. Wells, the Sixth Circuit
rejected any thought of a "male abortion," and
consistent with other courts, held that a putative
father was required to pay child support as a benefit
to the child."
When an unwed male and unwed female
have sexual intercourse that results in pregnancy, the
woman has several options:
When a female determines she is
pregnant, she has the freedom to
decide if she has the maturity level
to undertake the responsibilities of
motherhood, if she is financially
able to support a child, if she is at a
place in her career to take the time
to have a child, or if she has other
concerns precluding her from carrying the child to term. After weighing
her options, the female may choose
abortion. Once she aborts the fetus,
the female's interests in and obligations to the child are terminated. 88
However, the unwed father's options are
non-existent."8 His responsibilities to the child can
only be terminated with the female's decision to abort
the fetus or with the mother's decision to give the
child up for adoption.o Thus, he depends on the
decision of the female in determining his potential
fatherhood.'
Recent jurisprudence ensures the protection
of a female's right to reproductive choices.192
Unfortunately, the father does not enjoy the same
rights.'93 Although the financial interests of the child
are important, a putative father must have a voice in
the debate of reproductive rights.'9
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VI. Conclusion
When a mother infringes upon a father's
constitutional rights, the father has a cause of action
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' It is important that a mother's
reproductive rights are not diminished at the expense
of granting more expansive reproductive rights for a
father. Nonetheless, a father should have more legal
rights with respect to reproduction, procreation, and
personal autonomy. When the court assumes that a
mother will be a caregiver, she is automatically granted
inherent rights. For example, a mother's role as a
caregiver allows her to establish a biological connection
to her child; this same biological connection has not
been consistently legally recognized for fathers."'
While the biological relationship between a mother
and her child is clear, that same scientific clarity does
not exist for fathers.' 97
Reproductive rights are "[a] person's
constitutionally protected rights relating to the
control of his or her procreative activities . . .
Specifically the cluster of civil liberties relating to
pregnancy, abortion, and sterilization, especially the
personal bodily rights of a women in her decision
whether to become pregnant or bear a child."198
Based on the definition, reproductive rights are
generally viewed as a woman's right, and does not
explicitly provide similar rights for men. However,
court systems should adopt a nurture-based approach
in determining fatherhood in reproductive rights,
personal autonomy, and parenthood. Ultimately, "[a]
t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life."' 99 If the role of a father
is of any importance to families, his voice should be
taken into consideration in the debate of reproductive
rights, personal autonomy, and parenthood.
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